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FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS-IN NEED OF
DUE PROCESS
Government taking of property without just compensation is ex-
pressly prohibited by the fifth amendment.' Nevertheless, in some
situations the government may still confiscate a citizen's posses-
sions without reimbursement through the legal device of forfeiture.2
At common law all property of convicted felons was automatically
forfeited to the state.3 The United States government discontinued
this practice,4 but retained the statutory power to forfeit the in-
strumentalities of wrongdoing. In short, the state may proceed
against "things, 6 typically automobiles, used in criminal activities.
The United States Supreme Court recently upheld this type of
forfeiture of instrumentalities,7 but did not directly consider the due
process questions raised by the federal forfeiture statutes as they are
written.' This Note will analyze the possible remaining constitu-
tional challenges.
The Customs Duties Law9 and its companion administrative reg-
1. "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U:S. 663
(1974); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-18 (1970).
3. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 68-71 (3d ed. 1927);
1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 351 (2d ed. 1909).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1970).
5. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1594-1618 (1970).
6. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965);
Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1974); Menkarell v. Bureau
of Narcotics, 463 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. One 1971 Opel
G.T., 360 F. Supp. 638 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Jaekel v. United States, 304 F.
Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
7. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
8. Id.
9. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-18 (1970). The statutes provide in pertinent part:
"It shall be the duty of any officer, agent, or other person authorized by
law to make seizures of merchandise or baggage subject to seizure for
violation of the customs laws, to report every such seizure . . . . [It shall
be the duty of the appropriate customs officer to report such seizure or
violation to the United States attorney for the district in which such viola-
tion has occurred. . .. " Id. § § 1602-03. "The appropriate customs officer
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
ulations10 authorize the seizure and forfeiture of goods used in viola-
shall determine the domestic value, at the time and place of appraisement,
of any vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or baggage seized under the customs
laws." Id. § 1606. "If such value of such vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or
baggage does not exceed $2,500, the appropriate customs officer shall cause
a notice of the seizure of such articles and the intention to forfeit and sell
or otherwise dispose of the same according to law to be published for at
least three successive weeks in such manner as the Secretary of the Treas-
ury may direct. For the purposes of this section and sections 1610 and 1612
of this title merchandise the importation of which is prohibited shall be
held not to exceed $2,500 in value." Id. § 1607. "Any person claiming such
vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or baggage may at any time within twenty
days from the date of the first publication of the notice of seizure file with
the appropriate customs officer a claim stating his interest therein. Upon
the filing of such claim, and the giving of a bond to the United States in
the penal sum of $250, with sureties to be approved by such customs
officer, conditioned that in case of condemnation of the articles so claimed
the obligor shall pay all the costs and expenses of the proceedings to obtain
such condemnation, such customs officer shall transmit such claim and
bond . . . to the United States attorney . . . who shall proceed to a con-
demnation of the merchandise or other property in the manner prescribed
by law." Id. § 1608. "If no such claim is filed or bond given . . . the
appropriate customs officer shall declare the vessel, vehicle, merchandise,
or baggage forfeited . . . ." Id. § 1609. "If the value of any vessel, vehicle,
merchandise, or baggage so seized is greater than $2,500, the appropriate
customs officer shall transmit a report of the case . . . to the United States
attorney . . . for the institution of the proper proceedings for the condem-
nation of such property." Id. § 1610. "If no application for such remission
or restoration is made within three months after such sale . . . the pro-
ceeds of sale shall be disposed of as follows: (1) For the payment of all
proper expenses of the proceedings of forfeiture and sale, including expen-
ses of . . . the costs as taxed by the court . . . . In all suits or actions
brought for the forfeiture of any . . . [property] seized under the provi-
sions of . . . [the customs laws], where the property is claimed by any
person, the burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant . . . ." Id. §§
1613, 1615. "Whenever any person interested in any . . . [property]
seized under the provisions of this chapter . . . files with the Secretary of
the Treasury . . . a petition for the remission or mitigation of such ...
forfeiture, the Secretary of the Treasury, if he finds that such . . . forfei-
ture was incurred without willful negligence or without any intention on
the part of the petitioner to defraud the revenue or to violate the law . ..
may remit or mitigate the same upon such terms and conditions as he
deems reasonable and just . . . ." Id. § 1618.
10. 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.21-.51 (1974), as amended, 4§ 162.44(a), (b)(1),
39 Fed. Reg. 37633 (1974). The regulations provide in pertinent part: "Any
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tion of the customs laws." Once goods have been seized the statute
directs that they be appraised. 2 Procedural distinctions are then
made on the basis of the value of the goods." If the seized property
is valued at over $2,500, the statute requires that the case be re-
ported to the United States attorney for the institution of judicial
condemnation proceedings. 4 Service of process under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would then be mandatory. 5 If the goods are
valued at $2,500 or less, 6 however, the customs officer is only re-
quired to publish notice of the seizure and the intention to forfeit.
The Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to prescribe the type
of notification which will be given in these cases. 8 Regulations
published in the Code of Federal Regulations make further value
related procedural distinctions. 9 When the appraised value of any
property in one seizure from one person exceeds $250,10 notice must
be published for at least three successive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the customs and judicial districts in which the
Customs officer having reasonable cause to believe that any law . . . has
been violated by reason of which any property has become subject to
forfeiture, shall seize such property if available." Id. § 162.21(a). "Written
notice of . . .any liability to forfeiture shall be given to each party that
the facts of record indicate has an interest in the claim or seized property."
Id. § 162.31(a). "When the appraised value . . . exceeds $250, the notice
shall be published in a newspaper . . . for at least 3 successive weeks. In
all other cases, the notice shall be published by posting in a conspicuous
place accessible to the public . . . ." Id. § 162.45(b).
11. It should be noted that under 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1970), as
amended, (Supp. III, 1973), the forfeiture section of the Food and Drug
Law (Drug Abuse) provides that forfeiture proceedings are to be governed
by the customs laws.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1606 (1970).
13. Id. §§ 1607, 1610.
14. Id. § 1610.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
16. In addition to goods actually worth $2,500 or less, 19 U.S.C. § 1607
(1970) specifies that illegally imported merchandise, such as drugs, be held
not to exceed $2,500 and thereby subjects it to summary forfeiture.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 19 C.F.R. § 162.45 (1974).
20. The estimated ,value of narcotics and dangerous drugs is not in-
cluded in the appraised value. Id. § 162.45(b).
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property was seized.2' For property worth $250 or less, notice must
be posted for three successive weeks in a customs house nearest the
place of the seizure, in a place accessible to the public.2
Parties having an interest in seized goods worth $2,500 or less
must file a notice of claim with the United States Customs District
Director within twenty days of the government's first publication of
notice.23 Furthermore, such interested parties must give a bond to
the United States in the "penal" sum of $250, which can be used to
pay all costs and expenses of judicial proceedings if condemnation
results.24 When these conditions are fulfilled, the interested party is
entitled to the same treatment as parties claiming property worth
more than $2,500,25 and the case is transferred to the United States
attorney for judicial proceedings." Failure to post bond or to file a
claim within twenty days results in a declaration of forfeiture by a
customs officer, and the goods are sold. 27
The leading case on forfeiture is Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co.21 In Calero, a $19,000 pleasure yacht was seized and
forfeited after authorities found marijuana on board. 9 At the time
21. Id. This language has been interpreted to require one publication
per week for three successive weeks. Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics, 463
F.2d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1972).
22. 19 C.F.R. § 162.45(b) (1974).
23. Id. § 162.47(a); 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1970).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1970).
25. 19 U.S.C. section 1608 paraphrases section 1610 in prescribing the
procedure to be followed when the bond and petition are filed. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. § 1609. Exceptions to these rules are for perishable goods worth
$2,500 or less for which notice of sale need only be for a "reasonable time."
Id. § 1612; 19 C.F.R. § 162.48 (1974). And more important, there is an
exception for common carriers. 19 U.S.C. § 1594 (1970). Under this provi-
sion owners and drivers are exempted from forfeiture and seizure unless
they actually consented to the alleged illegal acts. This provision raises
serious questions of equal protection, but a discussion of the common
carrier exception is beyond the scope of this Note.
28. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
29. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas stated that a showing
that the use of the boat for smuggling was notorious might change the
equities of the situation: "But no such showing was made; and so far as
we know only one marihuana cigarette was found on the yacht." Id. at 693
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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of the seizure, lessees were in possession of the boat.'" The appellee
lessor, Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., was neither involved in nor
aware of the lessee's wrongful use of the yacht.3' The Supreme Court
upheld the forfeiture of the yacht despite the lessor's acknowledged
innocence32 and the lack of pre-seizure notice.3 The Court in Calero
concluded that suits against the instrumentalities of crime serve
legitimate punitive and deterrent purposes "both by preventing fur-
ther illicit use . . . and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby
rendering illegal behavior unprofitable."34 In reaching its conclusion
the Court employed the fiction of an in rem proceeding" and the
time-honored tradition of the "deodand,"36 a legal concept stem-
ming from the religious sacrifice of instrumentalities of wrongdoing.
The Court further observed that confiscation may induce innocent
owners and bailors to exercise greater care in transferring possession
of their property.37
30. Id. at 665.
31. Id. at 668.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 679-80. In dealing with the issue of pre-seizure notice the
Court held: "[T]his case presents an 'extraordinary' situation in which
postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure did not deny due
process." Id. (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 687.
35. Id. at 683.
36. Id. at 681. "The origins of the deodand are traceable to Biblical and
pre-Judeo-Christian practices, which reflected the view that the instru-
ment of death was accused [sic] and that religious expiation was re-
quired." Id. (footnote omitted). The Court noted: "Deodand derives from
the latin Deo dandum, 'to be given to God.'" Id. at 681 n.16; see Exodus
21:28: "If an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be stoned,
and his flesh not eaten . . . ." In plain English, a deodand is the thing
which was the immediate cause of the wrong. Under old English law it was
sold by the King and its proceeds applied to pious works. The innocence
of the owner of the deodand was considered immaterial to the requirement
that instruments causing wrongs be forfeited. See Comment, Due Process
in Automobile Forfeiture Proceedings, 3 U. BALT. L. REV. 270, 271-76
(1974).
37. 416 U.S. at 688. This is so despite the fact as noted in Justice
Douglas' dissenting opinion that: "[T]he owner had included in the lease
a prohibition against use of the yacht for an unlawful project." Id. at 693
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The Calero Court acknowledged the possible constitutional claim
of an owner who could show that he was innocent of wrongdoing and
had done "all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would
be difficult to conclude that forfeiture . . . was not unduly oppres-
sive."38 The facts of Calero appear to fit this description; neverthe-
less, the Court upheld the forfeiture. 9
The Calero decision, moreover, severely limited the reach of a
previous case4 which attacked the constitutional validity of forfei-
tures.4" In United States v. United States Coin and Currency,4"
respondent was convicted of failure to pay taxes on his gambling
winnings;43 the money used in his bookmaking operation thereby
became subject to forfeiture.44 The Supreme Court had remanded
the tax conviction for reconsideration in light of the rule that gam-
blers may assert the fifth amendment as a defense to a prosecution
for failure to file a tax return on their winnings." On appeal of the
forfeiture, the Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment would
also preclude a forfeiture of the funds not reported, despite the fact
that a forfeiture is a civil proceeding against the winnings them-
selves.4" The Court observed that "[w]hen the forfeiture statutes
38. Id. at 689-90 (footnote omitted).
39. As Justice Douglas makes clear in his dissenting opinion, the corpo-
rate owner did not know of the wrongful use of its property, was not notified
of the seizure, and had prohibited unlawful projects. Id. at 693 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
40. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715
(1971).
41. 416 U.S. at 680. The District Court of Puerto Rico held that United
States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) stood for the
demise of forfeiture statutes as a deprivation without just compensation.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337 (D.P.R. 1973),
rev'd. sub nom. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974). The Supreme Court flatly rejected this interpretation on appeal.
416 U.S. at 680; see Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 973 (10th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 656 (1974).
42. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
43. Id. at 716.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 716-17; see Angelini v. United States, 390 U.S. 204 (1968).
46. 401 U.S. at 722.
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are viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to
impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in
a criminal enterprise."47 Nevertheless, in Bramble v. Richardson,48
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit flatly rejected the asser-
tion that Coin and Currency had held the forfeiture statutes to be
criminal in nature," and the Supreme Court in Calero indicated
that Coin and Currency did not require the reasonable doubt stan-
dard in forfeiture proceedings."
Notice Provisions
Under the forfeiture statutes and regulations, the type of notice
a person receives is determined by the appraised value of the prop-
erty seized.5" According to the standards for notice established in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,52 only owners of
forfeited property worth over $2,500 are afforded due process.
Mullane held that due process requires that notice be reasonably
calculated to reach interested parties.53 The type of notice pre-
scribed for property worth $2,500 or less-publishing-falls short of
that standard. In fact, the type of notice required for property worth
$250 or less, posting in the customs house, would seem to be among
the least effective forms of notice, and therefore clearly unaccepta-
ble under the Mullane standard. The Court, in Mullane, did ac-
knowledge that publication may be the best notice possible under
some circumstances, but those circumstances must involve either
unknown parties or unobtainable addresses.54 In forfeiture
proceedings, it is unlikely that an owner will be unknown or that his
47. Id. at 721-22 (footnote omitted).
48. 498 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 656 (1974).
49. Id. at 973.
50. 416 U.S. at 680.
51. See text accompanying notes 9-27 supra.
52. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
53. Id. at 314. Mullane considered the question of notice to claimant
beneficiaries on the judicial settlement of accounts of a common trust
fund. Under the requirements of the New York Banking Law, the trust
company in Mullane was only required to notify claimants by newspaper
publication, and the Court held that such notice was a denial of due
process to known claimants. Id. at 320.
54. Id. at 319.
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address will be unobtainable."
The federal courts have considered the applicability of Mullane
to the forfeiture situation in two significant cases. In Robinson v.
Hanrahan,6 the Supreme Court found that notice by certified mail
to the plaintiff's home, as directed by the Illinois forfeiture statute,
was inadequate where plaintiff was in jail for the activities which
had resulted in the seizure." The Court stated that "it cannot be
said that the State made any effort to provide notice which was
'reasonably calculated' to apprise appellant of the pendency of the
forfeiture proceedings."58
In Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics," the Third Circuit found the
federal notice provisions unconstitutional in their operation, but did
not invalidate the forfeiture statute or its notice provisions. After
seizing the plaintiff's car for alleged narcotics violations, the Dis-
trict Supervisor of the Bureau of Narcotics caused notice of forfei-
ture to be published in a newspaper, despite the fact that he had
knowledge of Menkarell's address."0 Plaintiff, unaware of the notice,
failed to make a timely petition for the return of the vehicle and it
was summarily forfeited.6' In holding that such forfeiture did not
comport with due process,6" the court stated:
This kind of summary forfeiture proceeding is entirely too summary. Due
process may not demand actual notice in every case, but it forbids the use
of a method of notice which is not reasonably calculated to reach those who
could easily be informed . . ..
The court in Menkarell did not rule on the constitutionality of the
statutory notice provisions themselves, but it did hold that the sta-
tutory notice was not adequate in the situation before it. 4 Wuchter
55. Where valuable property is seized, it is often registered with a
licensing authority, or actually taken from the owner himself. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972).
56. 409 U.S. 38 (1972).
57. Id. at 40.
58. Id. (footnote omitted).
59. 463 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1972).
60. Id. at 92.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 94.
64. Id.
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v. Pizzuti,65 however, indicates that notice provisions similar to
those in the forfeiture statutes render the statutes unconstitu-
tional." Wuchter held that a statute which can cause deprivation
of property must specifically require proper notice. Actual notice,
without such a statutory requirement does not insulate the statute
from constitutional attack. 7 Both Robinson and Menkarell show the
reluctance of the courts to invalidate completely the forfeiture stat-
utes because of deficient notice provisions. Taken together, Mullane
and Wuchter" provide an argument that the statutes are unconsti-
tutional either where notice is given by publishing or where actual
notice is given despite the lack of such a statutory requirement. 9
Until a challenge is made to the notice provisions themselves, the
Court will probably leave the statutes intact and decide each case
on the adequacy of the notice actually received.
The Bond Requirement
In addition to the notice provisions, the $250 bond requirement
to obtain a judicial disposition of seized property worth $2,500 or
less also poses serious constitutional questions. Calero held that due
process does not require a hearing before the seizure of instrumen-
talities of crimes."0 The Court found extraordinary circumstances
which put such seizures outside the traditional pre-seizure hearing
requirements.7 Nevertheless, the right to a hearing before final dis-
65. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
66. Id. at 24.
67. Id. at 24-25. Wuchter, a Pennsylvania driver, collided with a New
Jersey resident in New Jersey. Under the law in question the Secretary of
State was designated to receive process for nonresident drivers. The stat-
ute did not require service on Wuchter, but actual notice was mailed to
him anyway. The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional, and
stated that actual notice "can not, therefore, supply constitutional validity
to the statute or to service under it." Id. at 24. Likewise, in Coe v. Armour
Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915), where a statute providing for execu-
tion on corporate property did not require notice to the shareholders, the
Court held that the fact of actual notice did not deny plaintiff standing as
a person "'who may justly complain.'" Id. at 423.
68. See text accompanying notes 53-67 supra.
69. Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13, 24-25 (1928).
70. 416 U.S. at 679-80.
71. Id.
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position of seized property is well established and remains un-
changed by Calero.2 Furthermore, the right to a hearing must be
more than a theoretical right. Boddie v. Connecticut" states it
must be "meaningful." 74
In Boddie, appellants were unable to pay the $45 court cost fee
necessary for filing a divorce action. Emphasizing that courts are
the only forum available for the dissolution of marriage,7" the Su-
preme Court held that "due process does prohibit a State from
denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to
individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages."'76 The
Court stated that, at a minimum, due process requires the oppor-
tunity for a hearing before deprivation of life, liberty, or property,77
and held that the court cost fee was unconstitutional in that it
denied indigents their right to a hearing. 6
The Court considered two factors: the relative importance of the
constitutional right and the procedural obstacles interposed be-
tween the citizen and a hearing to obtain that right.8 The Court
concluded that the dissolution of marriage through the courts was
a right which must be afforded without any cost requirement."
In United States v. Kras,8' the Court considered the constitution-
ality of a $50 filing fee for bankruptcy adjudications. The Court
upheld the fee8 and distinguished the case from Boddie both on the
basis of the interest at stake and the size of the obstacle. 3 The Court
noted that while resort to the courts was a spouse's only forum for
obtaining a divorce, a bankrupt may privately negotiate a settle-
72. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 339 (1969).
73. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
74. Id. at 379; see Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
75. 401 U.S. at 374.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 378.
78. Id. at 374.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
82. Id. at 450.
83. Id. at 445.
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ment with his creditors. 4 Moreover, the Court stated that bank-
ruptcy did not rise to the same level of constitutional importance
as divorce."5 Finally, in upholding the filing fee the Bankruptcy Act
permitted time payments of the fee which could be as little as $1.28
per week, payable after adjudication.86 In short, the Court con-
cluded that, in light of the constitutional interest at stake, the cost
requirement was not unreasonable. Four Justices dissented in Kras,
however, and Justice Marshall concluded in his dissent that
"[w]hen a person raises a claim of right or entitlement under the
laws, the only forum in our legal system empowered to determine
that claim is a court." 87
Another recent case, Ortwein v. Schwab,8 considered the ques-
tion of a $25 filing fee for welfare decision appeals, and followed the
Kras holding. Appellants, whose welfare payments had been re-
duced, challenged the constitutionality of the $25 filing fee required
in Oregon for judicial review of state welfare decisions. The Court
pointed out that due process does not require an appellate hearing
and stated that the interest at issue, namely welfare benefits, like
the interest in Kras, "has far less constitutional significance than
the interest of the Boddie appellants, '89 and that administrative
hearings which comport with due process satisfy the demands of the
United States Constitution even if the state does not provide an
appellate system .1
Calero affirmed the requirement of a hearing in the forfeiture
situation, before final disposition of the seized property,9 but the
only due process hearing under the present forfeiture statutes is the
judicial condemnation hearing, and the procedural requirement of
a $250 bond effectively denies such a hearing to indigents who by
definition cannot post the bond. Calero and Boddie require elimina-
tion of this requirement.
As yet, no case has squarely put to the Supreme Court the ques-
84. Id. at 444-45.
85. Id. at 445.
86. • Id. at 449.
87. Id. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
89. Id. at 659.
90. Id. at 660.
91. Id. at 656-58.
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tion of the constitutionality of the notice provisions or the bond
requirement. If a rejection of the forfeiture statutes is desirable,
these issues would seem to be the last remaining ground for litiga-
tion. Invalidation of the forfeiture statutes by the Court on proce-
dural grounds would present an opportune incentive for legislative
reconsideration.
Edward Wallace
